IEEE 933-1998 pdf download IEEE Guide for the Definition of Reliability Program Plans for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
1.2 Purpose
The purpose of this guide is to describe a basic framework (i.e, the program elements, guidelines on implementation, element interaction, and their scope of application) directed at improving nuclear power generating station performance through the effective implementation of reliability programs. It is oriented towardstation availability. encompassing balance-of-plant and safety-related equipment, Efective implementationof these guidelines should also improve plant safety by reducing challenges to safety systems in addition toenhancing reliable operation of the components of those safety systems.
2. References
This guide should be used in conjunction with the following publications. When the following standards aresuperseded by an approved revision, the revision shall apply.
EEE Std 352-1987 (Reaff 1999), IEEE Guide for General Principles of Reliability Analysis of NuclearPower Generating Stations Safety Systems.
IEEE Std 577-1976 (Reaff 1992), IEEE Standard Requirements for Reliability Analysis in the Design andOperation of Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
3. Definitions and acronyms
31 Definitions
For the purposes of this guide, the following terms and definitions apply. IEEE Std 100-1996 should be referenced for terms not defined in this clause.
3.1.1 acoustic monitoring: The detection of sound patterns emitted by equipment to determine its operatingcondition for predictive monitoring.
3.1.2 alert level: A probability value placed on equipment failure rates to identify when systems, trains, orcommponents are not achieving their target availability or reliability values.
3.1.3 analysis: A process of mathematical or other logical reasoning that leads from stated premises to theconclusion concerning specific capabilities of equipment and its adequacy for a particular application.(IEEE Std 100-1996)
3.1.4 availability: The characteristic of an item expressed by the probability that it will be operational at arandomly selected future instant in time.(IEEE Std 100-1996)
3.1.5 common-cause failure: Multiple failures attributable to a common cause. (IEEE Std 100-1996)
3.1.6 complete (catastrophic): Failure of equipment that is both sudden and total.
3.1.7 components: Items from which the system is assembled. (IEEE Std 100-1996)
3.1.8 condition monitoring: bservation, measurement, or trending of condition or functional indicalorswith respect to some independent parameler (usually time or cycles) to indicate the current and future abilityto function within acceptance criteria.(IEEE Std 323-1983)
3.1.9 critical components: Equipment whose failure will result in complete system or functional failure.
3.1.10 degraded: A failure that is gradual, partial, or both; for example, the equipment degrades to a levelthat, in effect, is a termination of the ability to perform its required function.
3.1.11 failure: The termination of the ability of an item to perform a required function. (IEEE Std 100-1996)
3.1.12 failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA): A systematic procedure for identifying the modes offailure and for evaluating their consequences.(IEEE Std 352-1987)
3.1.13 failure rate: The expected number of failures of a given type, per item, in a given time interval.(IEEE Std 100-1996)
3.1.14 fault tree analysis (FTA): A technique by which failures that can contribute to an undesired event areorganized deductively and represented pictorially.(IEEE Std 352-1987)
3.1.15 generating availability data system (GADS): Reliability information available from the NorthAmerican Electric Reliability Council.
3.116 GO: Availability analysis method similar to reliability block diagram with operators and eventactions included.
3.1.17 importance measures: A quantitative analysis to determine the importance of variations in equipment reliability to system risk and/or reliability.
3.1.18 incipient: An imperfection in the state or condition of equipment that could result in a degraded orimmediate failure if corrective action is not taken
3,1,19 inherent availability (IA): A measure of availability for a system operating in an ideal support envi.
ronment in which schedule maintenance, standby, and logistic time are ignored.(IEEE Std 352-1987)
IEEE 933-1998 pdf download
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