IEEE 37-2000 pdf download IEEE Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems
3.4 channel: An arrangement of components and modules, as required to generate a single protective actionsignal when required by a generating station condition. A channel loses its identity where single protectiveaction signals are combined.
3.5 common-cause failure: Multiple failures attributable to a common causc.
3.6 design basis events: Postulated events used in the design to establish the acceptable performancerequirements for the structures, systems, and components.
3.7 detectable failures: Failures that can be identified through periodic testing or that can be revealed byalarm or anomalous indication. Component failures that are detected at the channel, division, or system leveare detectable failures.
NOTE-Identifiable, but nondetectable failures are failures identified by analysis that cannot be detected through periodic testing or revealed by alarm or anomalous indication.
3.8 execute features: The electrical and mechanical equipment and interconnections that perform a functionassociated directly or indirectly with a safety function, upon receipt of a signal from the sense and commandfeatures. The scope of the execute features extends from the sense and command features output to, andincluding,the actuated equipment-to-process coupling.
NOTE-In some instances, protective actions may be performed by execute features that respond directly to the processconditions (e.g., check valves and self-actuating relief valves).
3.9 failure: The termination of the ability of an item to perform its required function
3.10 periodic test: Test performed at scheduled intervals to detect failures and verify operability
3.11 protection system: The part of the sense and command features involved in generating those signalsused primarily for the reactor trip system and engineered safety features.
3.12 protective action: The initiation of a signal within the sense and command features, or the operation ofequipment within the execute features, for the purpose of accomplishing a safety function.
3.13 redundant equipment or system: A piece of equipment or a system that duplicates the essential function of another piece of equipment or system to the extent that either may perfori the required functionregardless of the state of operation or failure of the other.
NOTE-Duplication of essential functions can be accomplished by the use of identical equipment, equipment diversityor functional diversity.
3,14 safety function: One of the processes or conditions (e.g.. emergency negative reactivity insertionpost-accident heat removal, emergency core cooling, post-accident radioactivity removal, and containmentisolation) that is essential in maintaining plant parameters within acceptable limits established for a desigrbasis event.
NOTE-A safety function is achieved by the completion of all required protective actions by the reactor trip system 0the engineered safety features, or both, concurrent with the completion of all required protective actions by the auxiliar)supporting features.
3.15 safety group: A given minimal set of interconnected components, modules, and equipment that canaccomplish a safety function.
IEEE 37-2000 pdf download
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