IEEE 1483-2000 pdf download IEEE Standard for Verification of Vital Functions in Processor-Based Systems Used in Rail Transit Control
3.1.10 mean time between hazardous events (MTBHE): The average time between occurrences of eventswhere hazardous events and the equipment that may precipitate them are defined at the system level. Thehazardous events included in MTBHE are those whose consequences are of a given severity, as determinedby the organization generating the safety goals.
3.1.11 mishap: An unplanned event or series of events resulting in death, injury, occupational illness, ordamage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment; an accident.
3.1.12 safe: Having acceptable risk of the occurrence of a hazard.
3.1.13 safety assurance: A characteristic of the implementation of a system that assures a level of safe
operation.
3.1.14 safety assurance concept: A design concept applied to processor-based systems that assures the failsafe implementation of identified functions, including safe operation in the presence of hardware failuresand/or software errors. Examples are: Checked Redundancy; Diversity and Self-Checking; NumericalAssurance: and N-Version Programming.
3.1.15 safety-critical: A term applied to a system or function, the correct performance of which is critical tosafety of personnel and/or equipment; also a term applied to a system or function, the incorrect performanceof which may result in an unacceptable risk of a hazard.
3.1.16 safety validation: A structured and managed set of activities that demonstrate that the system, asspecified and implemented, performs the intended functions, and that those functions result in overall safeoperation. Validation answers the question,“Did we build the right system?”
3.1.17 safety verification: A structured and managed set of activities that identify the vital functionsrequired to be performed by the system, and demonstrate that the system, including its subsystems, inter-faces and components, implements the vital functions fail-safely to a level that meets the allocated systemsafety goals. Verification answers the question, “Did we build the system right?”
3.1.18 self-revealing component failures: Component failures whose effects on system operation areimmediately and clearly apparent to a properly trained person.
3.1.19 software error: An error in a software element which, when executed, results in unintended systemoperation.
3.1.20 system safety: The application of engineering and management principles, criteria, and techniques tooptimize all aspects of safety within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time, and cost throughoutall phases of the system life cycle.
3.1.21 system safety goals-quantitative: A quantitative limit of the probability and/or frequency withwhich any vital function fails to be implemented safely.
3.1.22 system safety program: The combined tasks and activities of system safety management and systemsafety engineering that enhance operational effectiveness by satisfying the system safety requirements in atimely, cost-effective manner throughout the system life cycle.
IEEE 1483-2000 pdf download
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