BS EN 419211-6-2014 pdf download.Protection profiles for secure signature creation device Part 6: Extension for device with key import and trusted channel to signature creation application.
The rationale for T.Hack_Phys, T.SCD_Divulg. TSCD_Derive, T.Sig_Forgery, T.SVD_Forgery. P.CSP_Qcert. P.Qsign. P.Sigy_SSCD. A.CGA. A.SCA and A.CSP remains unchanged as given in the core PP SSCD KI [3], 4.3.2. The rationale how security objectives address the threats T.DTBS_Forgery and T.SigF_Misuse and the organisational security policy P.Sig_Non-Repud changes as described below.
T.SigF_Misuse (Misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE) addresses the threat of misuse of the TOE signature creation function to create SDO by others than the signatory to create an electronic signature on data for which the signatory has not expressed the intent to sign, as required by paragraph 1(c) of Annex Ill. OTLifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security) requires the TOE to detect flaws during the initialisation, personalisation and operational usage including secure destruction of the SCD, which may be initiated by the signatory. OT.Sigy_SigF (Signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only) ensures that the TOE provides the signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only. OE.DTBS_lntend (Data intended to be signed) ensures that the SCA sends the DTBSIR only for data the signatory intends to sign, The combination of OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_lmp (Trusted channel of TOE for DTBS) and OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp (Trusted channel of SCA for DTBS) counters the undetected manipulation of the DTBS during the transmission form the SCA to the TOE. OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (DTBSIR integrity inside the TOE) prevents the DTBSIR from alteration inside the TOE. If the SCA provides a human interface for user authentication. OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp (Trusted channel of HID for VAD) requires the HID to protect the confidentiality and the integrity of the VAD as needed by the authentication method employed. The HID and the TOE will protect the VAD by a trusted channel between HID and TOE according to OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp (Trusted channel of HID for VAD) and OT.TOE_TC_VAD_lmp (Trusted channel of TOE for VAD), OE.Signatory (Security obligation of the signatory) ensures that the signatory checks that an SCD stored in the SSCD when received from an SSCD-provisioning service provider is in non-operational state, i.e. the SCD cannot be used before the signatory becomes control over the SSCD. OE.Signatory (Security obligation of the signatory) ensures also that the signatory keeps their VAD confidential.
T.DTBS_Forgery (Forgery of the DTBS/R) addresses the threat arising from modifications of the DTBS!R sent to the TOE for signing which than does not correspond to the DTBSIR corresponding to the DTBS the signatory intends to sign. The threat T.DTBS,.Forgery is addressed by the security objectives OT.TOTC,DTBSjmp (Trusted channel of TOE for DTBS) and OE.SCAJC_DTBS..Exp (Trusted channel of SCA for DTBS), which ensure that the DTBS/R Is sent through a trusted channel and cannot be altered undetected In transit between the SCA and the TOE. The TOE counters internally this threat by the means of OT.DTBS.. Integrity_TOE (DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE) ensuring the integrity of the DTBSIR inside the TOE. The TOE IT environment also addresses T.DTBS_Forgery by the means of OE.DTBS,jntend, which ensures that the trustworthy SCA generates the DTBS/R of the data that has been presented as DTBS and which the signatory intends to sign in a form appropriate for signing by the TOE.
P.Sig_Non-Repud (Non-repudiation of signatures) deals with the repudiation of signed data by the signatory, although the electronic signature is successfully verified with the SVD contained in their certificate valid at the time of signature creation. This policy is implemented by the combination of the security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment, which ensures the aspects of signatory’s sole control over and responsibility for the electronic signatures created with the TOE.BS EN 419211-6-2014 pdf download.
BS EN 419211-6-2014 pdf download
PS:Thank you for your support!
